My Prediction: Iran May Take the Bait
My assumption is that Trump’s public remarks about avoiding an attack on Iran before the midterm elections are strategic.
Trump has a recognizable habit of using public statements to shape events, create pressure, and provoke reactions. In The Art of the Deal, he described promotional exaggeration as “truthful hyperbole,” and in his 2016 foreign-policy speech, he explicitly advocated unpredictability. His 2019 tariff threats against Mexico also illustrate how a threatened action can become leverage toward a different objective.
That pattern informs my reading of his remarks about Iran. I suspect his words are doing more than announcing a timetable: they are shaping his opponents’ calculations. What appears to be restraint may itself be a strategic move.
Trump is giving Iran the impression that renewed fighting would cost Republicans the election, encouraging its leaders to believe that provoking him would work to their advantage.
I predict that Iran and its aligned forces will continue escalating attacks on shipping and regional interests, increasingly drawing Saudi Arabia into the confrontation. The Saudis will then press for stronger American involvement, bringing Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States into closer cooperation against their shared threat.
Recent Events Seem to Support the Pattern
Recent developments appear consistent with my theory. Reuters reported on October 8 that tanker attacks around the Strait of Hormuz had reached their highest weekly level since the war began, accompanied by Iranian threats against alternative oil-export routes. The pressure on shipping and regional economies is increasing.
Meanwhile, the Iran-backed Houthis are putting Saudi Arabia directly under attack. Reuters reported that the October 10 strike on Riyadh’s international airport killed at least 12 people and wounded more than 300—the third attack on that airport that week. Trump subsequently said Washington was considering joining Saudi strikes against the Houthis.
These developments involve two distinct maritime fronts: Iranian pressure around the Strait of Hormuz and Houthi operations around the Red Sea’s Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Houthi advances along Yemen’s coast have also threatened Saudi oil-export routes.
In my reading, this is the sequence taking shape: escalating aggression, Saudi Arabia increasingly drawn into the confrontation, and growing pressure for American involvement. Whether Trump responds before or after the election, that aggression strengthens his public case for action. His restraint allows him to appear measured while Iran and its aligned forces supply further reasons for a response.
That is why I see these events as early support for my prediction: Iran may believe it is increasing pressure on Trump while actually strengthening his position.
Either way, Iran’s escalation strengthens Trump’s position. If he responds before the election, those attacks give him a stronger defensive rationale. If he waits until afterward, Iran’s continued aggression will have built a stronger case for action, with greater regional support. My prediction does not depend on Trump striking before Election Day.
The objective I envision is a focused campaign to cripple Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities and weaken the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Weakening the regime’s machinery of repression would give the Iranian people an opening to rise up and say, “No more.”
Between now and the November 3 elections, I will be watching for continued Iranian escalation, increasing threats to Saudi interests, Saudi calls for American action, and closer cooperation among Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States. After the election, I will watch whether those developments lead to the focused military response I anticipate.
My prediction is that Iran, believing it is exploiting Trump’s electoral vulnerability, will instead help create the conditions for a stronger coalition and a more politically justifiable and defensible response—whether that response comes before or after the election.
Speaking to the Right
Trump gains another advantage by holding off. As pressure mounts for military action, his restraint makes him appear more measured—the leader resisting kinetic action while others urge him forward. Supporters of Israel may increasingly criticize him for waiting, but that criticism could strengthen his standing with the anti-interventionist far right, demonstrating that he is making his own decisions rather than following Israel’s demands.
If he ultimately orders strikes, he can present them as a reluctant response to continued Iranian aggression after giving restraint every opportunity. Waiting therefore offers him both a public relations advantage and a stronger case for eventual action.
In my reading, this is what “3D chess” looks like: one move positioning Trump for several possible outcomes. Holding off encourages Iran to overreach, draws Saudi Arabia toward closer cooperation with America and Israel, and makes Trump appear measured as pressure to attack increases. Criticism from supporters of Israel could even strengthen his standing with the anti-interventionist far right by demonstrating his independence.
Whether he acts before or after the election, continued Iranian aggression builds a stronger case for the focused response I anticipate. Restraint itself becomes leverage: Iran believes it is exploiting Trump’s weakness while helping strengthen his position.
Epilogue: Beyond the Chessboard
There is another dimension to these events—one that reaches beyond elections, military strategy, and the calculations of presidents. As I watch the region’s alliances shift, I hear an echo of Ezekiel.
In Ezekiel 38, Persia stands among the powers gathered against Israel. Yet Sheba and Dedan appear in a different position, questioning the aggressor’s intentions:
“Art thou come to take a spoil? hast thou gathered thy company to take a prey?”
— Ezekiel 38:13, KJV
Their words challenge the assault on Israel rather than endorse it.
Ancient Dedan was located at what is now Al-Ula in northwestern Saudi Arabia. That geographical connection gives Saudi Arabia’s potential role particular significance in my prophetic reading. I see the possibility of an Arabian power increasingly recognizing that the threat against Israel is also a threat against itself—and raising its voice against the aggressor.
I am watching for that alignment: Persia threatening Israel, while voices from Arabia oppose the aggression. I see a possible foreshadowing of Ezekiel’s scene, rather than a declaration that every detail of his prophecy is unfolding today.
But Ezekiel’s ultimate message reaches far beyond the identity of the nations. The invading powers imagine that they control the outcome. God declares otherwise. The chapter ends with His promise that the nations will know Him through His intervention (Ezekiel 38:23).
Trump may be playing an intricate game of geopolitical chess. Iran’s rulers may believe they are doing the same. Yet my faith rests in a sovereignty greater than either.
The leaders make their moves. God keeps His promises.
