(Author is against the move.)
- The 1947-1948 war left Israel in control of the western part of the city, with Jordan taking the east. But Israel captured East Jerusalem from Jordan in 1967, effectively annexing it in 1980.
- While a few, small countries did maintain embassies in or near West Jerusalem, following the annexation of the East; all were relocated to Tel Aviv, where the United States and all other major countries’ embassies have always been. Moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem now would break this consensus. And it would be widely interpreted, especially by Israelis and Palestinians, as privileging Israeli and Jewish claims on the city and implicitly recognizing or condoning the annexation of East Jerusalem.
- Even if the Palestinian leadership knows that unrest, let alone violence, would be self-defeating and counterproductive, it may be unable to contain a spontaneous or organized explosion of rage in the occupied Palestinian territories, especially East Jerusalem. The Palestinian security services would try to contain the outrage, but their numbers and capabilities are limited (not least because of Israel’s restrictions), and they aren’t allowed to operate in most of the West Bank and not at all in East Jerusalem. Moreover, it will be politically difficult for Palestinian leaders to argue for calm while expressing the indignation necessary to maintain credibility.
- Hamas and other extremist groups will no doubt seek to exploit the situation. While mainstream Palestinian leaders will seek to prevent this, they will also have to ensure that they are not outbid by extremists.
- Palestinian leaders won’t be the only ones feeling compelled to register their vehement objections to the embassy move. Egypt and Jordan, both of which have long-standing peace treaties and security partnerships with Israel, would likely regard the relocation as a major violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of their peace treaties with Israel—both of which were brokered and guaranteed by the United States. They would not abrogate or rescind the treaties, but significant, public gestures of noncooperation with Israel, including recalling or expelling ambassadors, or suspending some cooperation, are conceivable.
- Gulf countries and other members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation would feel compelled to take public action to reassert the Palestinian, Muslim, and Christian claims on Jerusalem, and reject the implications of such a radical U.S. policy shift.
- June marks the expiration of a key presidential waiver. In 1995, the U.S. Congress passed a law providing for the relocation of the embassy, but allowing for a presidential waiver for six-month periods “to protect the national security interests of the United States.” That waiver has been invoked by every president until now, with almost no criticism. One of the simplest, albeit dangerous, steps that Trump could take is to allow the waiver to lapse in June, couple that with a big announcement of the fact, and then do virtually nothing to follow through on actually moving the embassy.
