Set aside the hatred, follow the reasoning, and ask whether Israel was obligated to wait until proof arrived in the form of a crater.
WHEN HATRED REPLACES THOUGHT
The problem is not that the political left disagrees with Donald Trump. Disagreement is necessary in a free country.
The problem is that many on the left hate Trump so intensely that they can no longer follow his reasoning. They reject his conclusions before considering how he reached them. If Trump believes something, they assume it must be foolish, dishonest, or dangerous. Any argument leading to the possibility that he might be right is dismissed before it can be heard.
That is not critical thinking. It is the abandonment of critical thinking.
A conclusion does not become false because Donald Trump reached it. An argument must be judged by its facts, logic, risks, and alternatives—not by the personality of the person making it.
What follows is not an argument that Trump must always be trusted or that every decision he makes is correct. It asks only that the reader do what so many of his critics refuse to do:
Set aside the hatred, follow the reasoning, and decide whether he is right.
The Argument in Brief
Iran was not a hypothetical enemy. It armed forces attacking Israel, launched drones and ballistic missiles at Israeli territory, restricted nuclear monitoring, and accumulated enough 60-percent-enriched uranium—if enriched further—for approximately ten nuclear weapons.
Israel was not required to wait for a bomb or proof that the order had been given. You do not owe a pursuer the last five minutes.
Iran’s rulers have shown what they are willing to sacrifice: their citizens, their economy, their neighbors, and peace. Israel could not assume that leaders willing to impose such suffering would become cautious once protected by nuclear weapons.
The Iranian people are not Israel’s enemy. They are victims of the same regime.
The war should end not with Iran destroyed, but with its nuclear, missile, and drone programs dismantled, its power weakened, and its people given an opportunity to reclaim their country.
The full argument—and the reasoning behind this conclusion—follows below.
FINISH THE WAR—AND GIVE IRAN BACK TO ITS PEOPLE
Israel was not required to wait for proof to arrive in the form of a crater. Now the war must end with the Islamic Republic stripped of the weapons it uses against Israel, its neighbors, and its own people.
The question is not whether war is terrible. It is.
The question is whether a nation that has already been attacked, repeatedly threatened with destruction, and confronted with an advancing nuclear capability must wait until its enemy assembles a finished weapon—or until intelligence confirms that the final order has been given.
Israel was not required to make that gamble.
This Was Not a Hypothetical Enemy
Iran was not merely developing a dangerous capability while maintaining peaceful relations with Israel. It armed, financed, and trained forces attacking Israel from Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
Then Iran crossed another line. In April and October 2024, it attacked Israel directly with waves of drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.
That fact fundamentally changes the argument.
Israel was not contemplating military action against a country that might someday become hostile. It was confronting an enemy already conducting armed attacks while simultaneously approaching the nuclear threshold.
Iran’s nuclear program could not be separated from Iran’s demonstrated willingness to use force against Israel.
The Duty Not to Wait for the Final Blow
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| A nation does not have to wait for the pursuer to complete his intended act. You do not owe a pursuer the last five minutes. |
Jewish law does not treat self-defense as a courtesy extended only after the knife has entered the body.
Pikuach nefesh places the preservation of human life above nearly every other commandment. The law of the rodef permits the stopping of a pursuer before the intended murder is completed.
These principles do not automatically settle every military or legal question. War threatens innocent life, too. Any use of force must still be judged by its necessity, proportionality, objectives, and available alternatives.
But the moral principle remains: the threatened are not required to surrender the last safe moment to the one threatening them.
A regime that rejects Israel’s legitimacy, arms forces dedicated to killing Israelis, attacks Israel directly, and builds the means of nuclear coercion is not a neighbor engaged in a tariff dispute. Under those circumstances, delay can cease to be prudence and become dereliction.
You do not owe a pursuer the last five minutes.
Iran’s Purpose Did Not Have to Be Imagined
Iran’s rulers did not need to be mind-read.
Their government maintained an eliminationist policy toward Israel. It supported organizations committed to Israel’s destruction. Iran had also conducted an undeclared, structured nuclear program involving activities relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.
In 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that Iran had failed to declare nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three undeclared locations connected to that earlier program. This did not prove that Iran had issued a current order to assemble a bomb. But it established that Iran had concealed weapon-related work and had never provided a complete and technically credible account of it.
That distinction matters.
The case for action does not require claiming that a completed weapon already existed. It rests upon the convergence of hostile intent, previous weaponization work, advanced uranium enrichment, restricted verification, an operational missile force, and direct attacks against Israel.
The Material Facts Had Transformed the Risk
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| Enriched uranium, restricted monitoring, ballistic missiles, and drones were not separate dangers. Together, they created a loaded interval. |
Immediately before the June 2025 strikes, Iran possessed approximately 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent.
If enriched further to weapons-grade, that stock contained enough nuclear material for approximately ten weapons under the IAEA’s standard measurement.
Uranium enriched to 60 percent is not a completed bomb. Nuclear material is not the same thing as a tested warhead mounted on a working missile. But enriching uranium from its natural state to 60 percent accomplishes most of the difficult enrichment work required to reach weapons-grade purity.
No other non-nuclear-weapon state had accumulated uranium enriched to that level.
At the same time, Iran had sharply restricted the additional monitoring arrangements associated with the nuclear agreement. The IAEA’s ability to reconstruct a continuous picture of Iran’s centrifuges, components, facilities, and enriched material had been seriously degraded.
Delivery was not some distant engineering project. Iran already possessed ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel—and had already fired them at Israeli territory.
The danger was not any single piece of evidence. It was the combination:
- Near-weapons-grade uranium in unprecedented quantities
- Industrial enrichment capacity
- A history of concealed weapon-related activity
- Reduced international visibility
- An operational ballistic-missile force
- Declared hostility toward Israel
- Direct attacks demonstrating a willingness to use that force
None of these facts, standing alone, proved that Iran was about to assemble a nuclear weapon. Together, however, they created a danger that Israel could not responsibly judge as though each fact existed in isolation.
It was a loaded interval.
Diplomacy Delayed the Danger but Did Not Resolve It
Diplomacy was not meaningless.
The 2015 nuclear agreement imposed genuine restrictions and provided substantially greater international visibility into Iran’s nuclear activities. Iran initially remained within many of those restrictions, and the United States’ withdrawal in 2018 helped begin the sequence through which those limitations eventually collapsed.
That history should be acknowledged. Overstating the failure of diplomacy only weakens the argument.
But by 2025, the relevant question was no longer whether diplomacy had once slowed Iran’s nuclear progress. It had.
The question was whether another round of negotiations could reliably eliminate the advanced stockpile, restore intrusive verification, resolve the unanswered questions about undeclared sites, limit Iran’s missile forces, and prevent the regime from rebuilding the same capabilities later.
For approximately two decades, the world had tried negotiations, sanctions, inspections, temporary agreements, diplomatic warnings, and economic incentives. Yet Iran emerged with advanced centrifuges, an unprecedented stockpile of highly enriched uranium, unresolved safeguards questions, a mature ballistic-missile force, and reduced international monitoring.
“One more round of negotiations” was therefore not a cost-free position.
Time was the very resource Iran’s nuclear program consumed—and the one resource Israel could never recover.
The Regime Has Shown What It Is Willing to Sacrifice
Iran’s rulers have shown that they are willing to impose almost any cost in pursuit of their ideological and strategic objectives.
They have slaughtered and imprisoned their own citizens to preserve the regime. They have sacrificed Iran’s economy rather than abandon policies that brought sanctions and international isolation. Through Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and other armed organizations, they have helped drag Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and the wider region into recurring destruction.
The regime is willing to fight Israel to the last Palestinian, the last Lebanese civilian, the last Yemeni child—and, increasingly, to the last Iranian.
Current events have made the pattern impossible to dismiss. The Islamic Republic will endanger its neighbors, impoverish its citizens, and accept staggering national losses before surrendering the ambitions upon which its authority rests.
That record matters when judging the nuclear danger.
Deterrence depends upon the belief that an adversary values the consequences it is threatened with more than the objective it is pursuing. But Iran’s rulers have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to make other people bear almost any consequence.
Israel could not safely assume that leaders willing to sacrifice their citizens, their neighbors, and their economy would suddenly become cautious and conventional once protected by nuclear weapons.
The danger was not merely that Iran might someday use a nuclear weapon. Nuclear possession could give a demonstrably reckless regime much greater freedom to conduct conventional and proxy warfare beneath a nuclear shield.
The Two Possible Errors Were Not Equal
Suppose Israel overestimated Iran’s proximity to a nuclear weapon.
The consequences of acting would be severe: deaths, regional escalation, economic disruption, diplomatic isolation, and the possibility that Iran would attempt to rebuild its nuclear program deeper underground.
Those costs cannot simply be waved away.
But suppose Israel underestimated the danger. It could then confront a nuclear-armed enemy that had already attacked it, surrounded it with armed proxies, and repeatedly denied its right to exist.
The two mistakes were not equal.
The first could produce a costly and possibly temporary military setback. The second could place the continued existence of a small country in the hands of a regime that had already demonstrated both the intent and capacity for aggression.
Israel’s leaders were not required to bet their country on the most reassuring interpretation of every uncertainty.
The People Suffering Most Are the People of Iran
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| The Iranian people are not Israel’s enemy. They are the longest-suffering victims of the Islamic Republic—and the rightful heirs to Iran’s future. |
The people who have suffered longest under the Islamic Republic are the Iranian people themselves—the Persian majority and Iran’s other ethnic and religious communities.
They have endured repression, executions, economic ruin, international isolation, and wars pursued in the name of a revolutionary regime they did not freely choose.
The Iranian people are not Israel’s enemy. They are also victims of the same regime threatening Israel and destabilizing the Middle East.
For that reason, the most humane course may not be to prolong the conflict through a succession of limited exchanges that leave the regime’s war-making machinery intact. It may be to complete the military task decisively: destroy the remaining nuclear, ballistic-missile, and drone capabilities; severely weaken the armed forces and command structures used to threaten Iran’s neighbors; and cripple the repressive machinery used to keep the regime in power.
The objective should not be the destruction of Iran.
It should be the liberation of Iran from the machinery that has impoverished its citizens, destabilized its neighbors, and protected a revolutionary dictatorship from its own people.
Give the Iranian People Their Opportunity
Military force cannot manufacture a free government. Foreign nations should not occupy Iran or attempt to choose its next rulers. Another externally imposed regime would merely replace one form of domination with another.
But military action can remove the weapons and institutions that make meaningful resistance nearly impossible.
The Iranian people have repeatedly shown that they want a different future. They have taken to the streets knowing they could be arrested, beaten, tortured, or killed. Women have defied the regime openly. Workers, students, merchants, religious minorities, and families of murdered protesters have demonstrated extraordinary courage.
They do not need foreigners to determine their future. They need an opportunity to determine it themselves.
If the regime can no longer protect itself through terror at home, aggression abroad, ballistic missiles, armed proxies, and the threat of nuclear breakout, the people of Iran may finally have the opening they have been waiting for.
No one can guarantee what they will do with that opportunity. But the possibility of an Iran reclaimed by its people is more humane—and ultimately more stable—than preserving a dictatorship that sacrifices them to sustain its revolutionary ambitions.
Finish the War
The case was never simply that Iran might someday build a bomb.
Iran was already waging war against Israel directly and through proxies. It had accumulated the hardest material ingredient for multiple nuclear weapons, possessed missiles capable of delivering them, concealed important parts of its earlier nuclear work, and reduced the international community’s ability to verify its activities.
Force was therefore not the first impulse. It was the conclusion that the remaining interval could no longer safely be donated to the other side.
Now the war should not be prolonged through indecision or ended with the regime’s most dangerous capabilities still intact.
It should be finished by destroying Iran’s remaining nuclear, missile, and drone programs; weakening the military and leadership structures responsible for aggression and repression; and ensuring that the Islamic Republic cannot simply pause, rebuild, and begin the cycle again.
That conclusion does not require pretending that war is costless, that every target is legitimate, that every strike will be proportionate, or that military power alone can permanently erase scientific knowledge or political fanaticism.
It requires accepting this:
A nation already under attack is not obligated to wait for courtroom certainty about the weapon that could make its destruction irreversible. When the cost of waiting may be national annihilation, proof cannot be required to arrive in the form of a crater.
And the Iranian people should not be condemned to another generation beneath a regime that has sacrificed their freedom, their prosperity, and their children to its dream of revolutionary conquest.
The war should end not with Iran destroyed, but with the Islamic Republic stripped of the weapons it uses against Israel, its neighbors, and its own people—and with the people of Iran finally given the opportunity to take back their country.
Sources and Documentation
The factual claims in this article are based primarily upon reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations and other official records. The conclusions and arguments drawn from those facts are my own.
1. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2025/50, September 3, 2025.
Reports that, as of June 13, 2025, Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235.
2. International Atomic Energy Agency, “NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2025/25, May 31, 2025.
Provides the IAEA’s comprehensive assessment of Iran’s earlier undeclared structured nuclear program and undeclared nuclear material and activities at Lavisan-Shian, Varamin and Turquzabad. The report also states that the IAEA had no credible indications of an ongoing undeclared structured program of the same type.
3. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2025/24, May 31, 2025.
Documents Iran’s enriched-uranium inventory and the loss of monitoring and verification measures previously provided under the nuclear agreement.
4. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, Statement to the United Nations Security Council, June 20, 2025.
Confirms that Iran possessed more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent and identifies Fordow as Iran’s principal location for enrichment to that level.
5. Reuters, “Much of Iran’s Near-Bomb-Grade Uranium Likely to Be in Isfahan, IAEA’s Grossi Says,” March 9, 2026.
Reports the IAEA estimate that Iran’s 440.9-kilogram stockpile, if enriched further, could provide sufficient fissile material for approximately ten nuclear weapons under the agency’s measurement.
6. United Nations Secretary-General, Remarks to the Security Council, April 14, 2024.
Records Iran’s direct launch of hundreds of drones and missiles from Iranian territory toward Israel.
7. United Nations Security Council, “Deadly Cycle of Tit-for-Tat Violence Must Stop,” October 2, 2024.
Records Iran’s October 1 launch of approximately 200 ballistic missiles toward Israel and the Secretary-General’s condemnation of the attack.
8. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2023.”
Documents Iran’s material, financial and training support for Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and other armed groups operating across the Middle East.
"Read the State Department report"
9. United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran, March 14, 2025.
Documents the Iranian government’s continuing systematic repression, surveillance, executions and persecution connected to the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests.














