Iran systematically misled and exploited the expectations of those who believed it was fully complying with the JCPOA's spirit and long-term intent, even if it technically adhered to many monitored limits in the early years.
From 2016–Mid-2019, the IAEA repeatedly verified that Iran met core JCPOA limits on its declared nuclear activities:
- Enrichment capped at 3.67%.
- Centrifuge numbers restricted (mostly IR-1 models).
- No reprocessing, etc.
THEY WERE WRONG AND LIBERALS WERE DECEIVED!
Eroneous reports led Obama supporters who wanted to believe Iran was in compliance. However, even then, issues emerged:
- Iran twice exceeded the 130-ton heavy water limit (by small margins) in 2016, then exported excess to comply.
- Allegations of operating slightly more advanced centrifuges than allowed in R&D (disputes over "roughly 10" IR-6s).
- Procurement attempts for sensitive items outside official channels (e.g., German intelligence reports).
Critics noted Iran tested boundaries and benefited from sanctions relief while maintaining (or hiding) parallel capabilities.
After the U.S. withdrawal and reimposed sanctions, Iran began stepwise violations of JCPOA limits (verified by IAEA):
- Increased enrichment levels beyond 3.67% (up to 60%+ near weapons-grade).
- Installed and used advanced centrifuges (IR-2m, IR-6, etc.) in larger numbers.
- Conducted prohibited R&D and accumulated uranium metal.
Iran knew what it was doing all along! After 4 years with Biden, by 2025, Iran's near-weapons-grade stockpile had grown dramatically (hundreds of kg at 60%), shortening breakout time to weeks.
Iran Conducted Deeper Deception Undeclared Activities and Safeguards Violations:
This is where "fooling" is clearest. The JCPOA assumed a baseline of declared activities, but IAEA investigations (intensified post-2018 Israeli intelligence on the "nuclear archive") revealed:
- Evidence of secret experiments (e.g., neutron sources for weapons initiation) into the early 2000s, with concealment/sanitization efforts.
- Iran's refusal to provide credible explanations or full access, despite requests.
In June 2025, the IAEA Board formally found Iran in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement for the first time in 20 years—citing failures to declare material/activities and lack of cooperation. The agency cannot verify the program is "exclusively peaceful."
Iran's history of denial, deception, and "sanitation" of sites predates and continued alongside the JCPOA. The deal's verification was strong for *declared* sites but weaker for undeclared/military ones, which Iran EXPLOITED.
BOTTOM LINE:
Supporters, like Thomas Friedman, who trusted Iran would evolve into a compliant partner were proven wrong by the pattern:
+ incremental cheating
+ outright concealment on past and ongoing military dimensions.
This aligns with Iran's broader track record of violating prior agreements. The JCPOA bought time on the declared program but failed to resolve fundamental distrust or prevent threshold status. Those advocating renewed diplomacy failed to confront this record of evasion head-on.
There were well-documented gaps in the JCPOA framework. The deal was narrowly focused on verifiable nuclear activities at declared sites. It explicitly left Iran's ballistic missile, drone, and conventional military programs largely unconstrained.
Ballistic Missiles and Drones:
- The JCPOA itself contained no limits on Iran's missile or drone development, production, or testing. Negotiators (including the U.S.) tried to include them, but Iran, backed by Russia and China, refused.
- UNSCR 2231 (which endorsed the JCPOA) only "called upon" Iran to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles "designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons" for eight years (until October 2023). This was non-binding language ("calls upon," not "decides"), and Iran rejected the premise that its missiles were nuclear-capable. It continued testing and advancing solid-fuel missiles (e.g., Kheibar Shekan, Fateh variants), improving accuracy, range, and survivability.
- Drones (UAVs) faced even fewer restrictions. Iran ramped up production and exports (e.g., Shahed-series to Russia, proxies). Post-2023 expiration of UN provisions, the U.S. and allies imposed unilateral sanctions on these programs, but the infrastructure was already built.
- Iran's missile force grew to be the largest in the Middle East, with underground basing and mobile launchers enhancing survivability.
Sanctions Relief and Cash Flows Funded Iran:
Sanctions relief under the JCPOA unfroze Iranian assets and allowed renewed oil sales, providing tens of billions in revenue. Estimates of accessible funds varied (~$50–100 billion net after debts).
The notable cash transfer was the **$1.7 billion** settlement (January 2016) of a pre-1979 arms deal dispute: $400 million principal + $1.3 billion interest, paid in cash (euros/Swiss francs) due to banking restrictions. It coincided with hostage releases. Critics called it ransom or enabling cash; the Obama administration described it as settling a legal claim.
This, plus broader relief, gave Iran economic breathing room. Iran has long invested in underground "missile cities" and hardened facilities (e.g., mountain tunnels near Yazd, Fordow for nuclear, IRGC bases). These expanded during/after the relief period. Reports describe deep, fortified networks for missiles, drones, and command centers, designed to survive airstrikes. Recent conflicts highlight their resilience.
The "time gained" via delayed pressure and revenue allowed further fortification, proliferation to proxies, and dual-use advancements. This aligns with Iran's doctrine of asymmetric deterrence and "forward defense" via missiles/proxies.
These omissions were core flaws cited by opponents of the JCPOA from the start: it addressed one symptom (declared nuclear enrichment) while allowing the broader threat architecture (delivery systems, regional aggression) to mature. Sanctions relief provided fungible resources that strengthened the regime's military posture.
Iran exploited the deal's narrow scope and loopholes while advancing capabilities outside its bounds.
HEAVEN HELPED US!
A Harris presidency (2025–2029) would likely have extended the pattern of diplomatic engagement, sanctions waivers, and restraint on kinetic options—precisely the conditions that allowed Iran to sprint toward nuclear threshold status by mid-2025.
Trump critics like Thomas Friedman have often framed the Iran issue through a lens that prioritizes diplomatic engagement and downplays (or attributes elsewhere) the costs of prior restraint-based policies. This pattern persists even after events like Operation Midnight Hammer validated concerns about Iran's unchecked advances.
Friedman was a leading advocate for the Obama-era JCPOA. In 2015 interviews and columns, he presented it as a pragmatic bet: Iran keeps some infrastructure but is delayed from a bomb, with Obama emphasizing engagement over isolation. He argued it was worth testing because the U.S. held overwhelming power and could adjust.
Post-2018 (Trump withdrawal), Friedman continued critiquing "maximum pressure" while highlighting risks of escalation. In the 2025–2026 period, amid strikes and follow-on conflict, he acknowledged the clerical regime's brutality and hoped for its military defeat or collapse. BUT, Friedman expressed being "torn" over the prospects of defeating Iran because he does not want Trump or Netanyahu politically strengthened. During a war no less! That is shameful!
WITH THE 2004 ELECTION OF DONALD J TRUMP, ISRAEL DODGED A NUCLEAR MISSILE. Miraculously, in also dodged hundreds of ballistic missiles fired at it.
The counterfactual under continued Harris-style policy is that Iran would have broken out of any nuclear threshold by now with catastrophic risks for Israel. Not to mention the probability that a worse Oct 7th may have happened in Northern Israel while thousands of Iranian ballistic missiles and drones rained down all over Israel.
Friedman's "torn" stance—rooting against the regime's survival succeeding under Trump—illustrates how partisan animus can cloud threat prioritization. Iran's history of bad-faith talks, concealment, and "march to a weapon" (IAEA-verified) made trust-based deals risky, as Midnight Hammer's necessity demonstrated.
Dismissing the empirical failures of the prior doctrine—enrichment surges, cash flows, proxy boldness—while fixating on Trump hatred ignores measurable outcomes. Policy success is measured by Iran's capabilities and behavior, not personalities. The 2025 strikes disrupted a dangerous trajectory that softer approaches failed to halt.
NOW IS THE TIME TO RALLY BEHIND USA AND ISRAELI SOLDIERS AND OUR ADMINISTRATION IN THEIR BATTLE AGAINST THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT THAT IRAN HAS POSED FOR 47+ YEARS.
